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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
DEAN E. PARK,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY,
a corporation; METROPOLITAN
WATER DISTRICT OF OREM, a
public corporation; and OREM CITY,
a municipal corporation,
Defendants and Respondents.

Case No.
11345

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal Company does not
differ with Appellant on his Statement of the Gase, disposition of the matter by the lower court and lthe relief sought
by him through this appeal. However, .the Statement of
Facts is incomplete, as substantial evidence which supports
this Respondent's position in the case has not been stated.
Therefore, in order to place ithe issues in their proper factual setting, counsel) for Respondent Alta Ditch & Cana1
Company will set forth herein its own statement of facts.
1
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent A'ltta Ditch & Canal Company wil'l be called
herein "ALTA" and the old defunct corporation which was
the predecessor in interest of Respondent Alta Ditch &
Canal Company will be called herein "OLD ALTA". This
Statement of Facts is taken from the record and particularly from the Findings of Fact which underlie the judgment appealed from.
1.

The water of Alta Spring.

Prior to May 20, 1893, the waiters of the Alta Spring
in Utah County were devefoped and a distribution system
was constructed through which it was conveyed to property on the Orem Bench (R. 87, Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 2-3).
2.

Conveyance of all water rights in Alta Spring and
all property rights in the distribution system of
Old Alta.

The early owners of all water rights in Alta Spring
and of all property rights of every kind in the distribution
system became the incorporators of the old Alta Ditch company on May 20, 1893. At that lt!ime, they conveyed all of
their interest in both the Alta Spring water and the distribution facilities to the corporation (R. 87, Ex. 3, Vol. 2,
Findings of Facit and Conclusions of Law, pp. 2-3).
3.

Expiration of the charter of Old Alta.

The charter of Alta Ditch & Canal Company (Old)
expired on May 20, 1943. At the time that it became de-

funct, its principal asset was water from the Alta Springs
and the irriigation system developed for the distribution
thereof to its shareholders. There were outstanding filie
originally issued 288 shares of stock in Old Alita, of which
186-5/6 shares were then owned by individuals and 101-1/6
shares were owned by Orem City (R. 88, Ex. 7, p. l; Ex. 3,
Vol. 1, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 5-6).
4.

Organization of Alta.

Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal Company was organized on November 26, 1946 by all of the individual stockholders owning 186-5/6 shares of the old corporation, with
articles and powers similar to those of Old Alita. Orem
City, the owner of the remaining 101-1/6 shares of stock
in the old corporation, did not join with the individual
stockholders in forming the new corporation '(R. 88).
Verena C. Crandall, predecessor in interest of the Appellant
here, subscribed to the Articles of Incorporation which
recited that her interest, and all interests of the other incorporators of Alta in the waters of Alta Ditch and the
distribution facilities, had been conveyed to Alta (Ex. 7).
5.

Civil Action No. 15,460 filed in the District Court
of Utah County by Orem City against Alta and
others .

.Ailthough Orem City did not participate in the formation of rtfu.e new Alta Ditch & Canal Company, it did for a
number of years consent fo the administration of all of the
waters of the Alta Ditch by the new corporation. However,
Orem City sought to change :the point of diversion of its
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water rights represented by its 101-1/6 shares in the old
corporation. The officers and directors of the new corporation refused to consent to the proposed change and
Orem City filed Civil Action No. 15,460 in the District
Court of Utah County wherein it was held in substance
that the legal title to the water, water rights and water
system involved was in the old corporation, and not in its
shareholders, and that the shareholders, the individual
water users, were not the real parties in interest and were
not necessary parties to the action. It ordered that the
trustees of the old corporation forthwith proceed to liquidate the affairs of the old corporation and to convey to the
"equitable owners" thereof or their successors in interest
all of the property, assets, rights and privileges owne~l by
the old corporation, including Orem City, which was entitled to 101-l/6./288ths thereof. Orem City was further
granted the right to change the point of diYersion of all or
any part of the water represented by its 101-1/6i288ths
(34.82%) of the total rights of the said old Alta Ditch &
Canal Company ( R. 88-9) .
The foregoing facts are quoted from Finding X o. 5 of
the Findings of Fact which underlie the judgment appealed
from. Although Appellant does not challenge Finding Xo.
5, it does quote out of context the follo"ing single finding
of the trial court in Case No. 15,460 :
''That the new Alta Ditch and Canal Company
has acquired no title in. or to, the said Alta Ditch
or water and has no right to control or liquidate
said property or rights beyond that which may be
accorded to it by common consent of the persons in-
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terested,
property
with the
cordance

the right to regulate and administer the
for the purposes of liquidation remaining
old corporation until its winding up in acwith the provision of this decree ... "

The language so quoted by AppeHant may, at first
blush, appear to be inconsistent with certain parts of Finding No. 5. It is, therefore, deemed by Respondent Alta
Ditch & Canal Company necessary to quote other pertinen't
parts of the record in Case No. 15,460 to place the matter
in proper perspective. Those portions of the record are
quoted and discussed in Appendix I attached hereto. An
examinaJtion thereof demonstrates that the trial court in
Case No. 15,460 found and held in substance as follows:
a) All of the owners of Alta Ditch waters and
diversion facilities were incorporators of the Old Alta
Ditch & Canal Company.
b) By executing the articles of the old incorporation, the incorporators conveyed all of itheir proprietary interests therein to the old corporation which
thereafter held legal title thereto.
c) After incorporaJtion, the only interest of the
incorporators in the water and distribution facilities
was as a stockholder of the old corporation.
d) When the charter of the old corporation expired, the corporation became defunct, buit still continued to exist for the limited purpose of winding up
its affairs and conveying legal title to its assets to the
parties entitled thereto.
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e) The shareholders of the old corporation did
not become tenants in common of the underlying assets
of the old corporation. Their only remedy with respect
to the old corporation was to file an action against the
Director-Trustees of the old corporation to compel
winding up and conveyance of remaining property to
the parties entitled thereto.
Although the old corporation held the legal
title to the water, water rights and distribution facilities involved, the equitable title was held by the new
corporation and by Orem City.
f)

g) The only necessary parties in the action by
Orem City affecting rights to and use of such water,
water rights and facilities were: ( 1) the old corporation with bare legal title; (2) its Director-Trustees
who controlled its action; and (3) the new corporation
with equitable title to a 188/288th interest.
6.

Failure to comply with the Trial Court's decree
in Civil Case No. 15,460.

The Director-Trustees of the old defunct corporation
did nort comply with the decree of the Trial Court in winding up the affairs of the old corporation. Neither did they
convey the legal title to the assets of the defunct corporation, including its water and water rights, to Orem City
and to the new corporation as directed by the Court. However, since the date of the entry of the decree, Orem City
has utilized irts 34.82 % of the water and water rights of the
old corporation independently under claim of rig1ht under
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the di vision arrangement provided in the decree in Civil
No. 15,460. The balance of the water and water rights initially owned by the old corporation (except for an individual culinary right not here in issue) has been administered under claim of right by the new corporation since
the date of said decree (R. 89). In this regard, it is of
particular signifi0ance to note that Appellant himself personally signed the ,stipulation which resulted in the amendment of the judgmenrt and decree in Civil Ca:se No. 15,460
and was one of the Director-Trustees who faHed to comply
with the decree of the Trial Court in conveying the legal
title of the defunct corporation to Orem Cirty and to the
new corporation. (See Tr. 117-8; Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Stipulation;
quoted in pertinent part in the Appendix attached hereto).
7.

Acquisition by the Appellant of Stock in Alta.

Verena C. Crandall, predecessor in interest of the Appellant, acquired Certificate No. 2'13 representing two
shares of stock in the old corporation on November 4, 1945,
approximately one year prior to the incorporation of the
new Alta Dirtch & Canal Company. In November of 1946,
Verena C. Crandall subscribed to the Articles of Incorporation of the new corporation and thereby conveyed to the
new corporation all of her right, title and interest in the
said two shares of stock and assets of the old corporation
in exchange for two shares of stock in the new corporation.
Thereafter, Verena C. Crandall transferred said two shares
of stock in the new corporation to Robert Calder and stock
Certificate No. 220 was issued by the new corporation to
Robert Calder on May 5, 1947. 1In 1949, Appellant acquired
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said two shares of stock evidenced by Certificate No. 220
from Robert Calder and the transfer thereof was made on
the books of the new corporation on March 7, 19'51, whereupon Certificate No. 22'4 representing two shares of stock
was issued to Appellant (R. 89).
8.

Status of Appellant as a stockholder of Alta.

From and after the time he acquired his two shares of
stock in the new corporation, Appellant was treated as a
srtockholder thereof for al'l purposes. Appellant at all times
material here affirmatively asserted his status and sfanding as a shareholder of the new corporation. He was assessed his pro-:riata share in the years when income was insufficient to meet opera ting expenses and was tendered his
pro-raita dividends in years when income exceeded operating expenses. The Board of Direcitors and the shareholders
of the new A'lta Ditch & Canal Company have met reguliarly
since the formation of the corporation and have maintained
minutes of their meetings. At these regular meetings, the
affairs of the corporation and its shareholders were discussed, approval for proposed action was given, assessments were approved, dividends were voted and contracts
were approved. Appellant as a shareholder received notice
of all meetings, which he seldom attended. Appellant, him·
self, at the March 21, 1962 meetJing, seconded the motion to
re-elect the presently constituted officers (R. 90, 92).
9.

Connection by Appellant to the Orem City culinary
pipeline.

Respondent Orem City is the exclusive owner of a 14
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inch diameter pipeline which is an integral and necessary
part of its water works system whereby waters to which
Respondent Orem City is entitled from the Alta Springs,
either in its own righrt or by agreement and exchange with
Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal Company, are diverted and
conveyed by Orem City for 'beneficial use by its inhabitants
and persons outside of 1its corporate limits. In 1949, Appellant connected into the bottom of said 14 inch pipeline aJt a
point above his property and from there constructed a 4
inch steel pipeline to his property. No representative of
Alta was a party to the discussions leading rto the connection and construction of the 4 inch pipeline (R. 90-91).
In 1958, Appellant replaced the 4 inch steel pipeline
with a 6 inch transite pipeline and equipped the same with
a meter wt a point where the 6 inch pipeline enters his
property. Appellant did not consult with representatives
of either Respondents Alta Ditch & Canal Company, Orem
Oity or Metropolitan Water District of Orem concerning
this change. The connection to Respondent Orem City's 14
inch pipeline was without corporate authorization from
Alta and the water which Appellant has been permitted by
Orem City to divert and take ,therefrom has been permissive only. Appellant's connec'tion to Orem City's 14 inch
pipeline and his permissive use of water therefrom has
been terminated and Appellant has been so notified by
Orem City. In making said connection and constructing
said p~peline and using water conveyed thereby, Appellant
did not rely upon any act or any failure to act of any representative of Alta (R. 91).
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10.

Appellant claims only an arrangement 1cith Orem
City authorizing connection 1cith its pipeline and
diversion of water through the pipeline.

Significantly, Appellant does not claim any agreement
as against Alta for authorization to connect with or divert
water from the Orem City line. He has no stan:iing here
to assert such claim for the Court below specifically found
that no such agreement existed, either in writing or otherwise, between Appellant and Alta. This finding as to Alta
is compelled by the evidence. In describing the absence of
any participation by Alta in the transaction leading to such
connection and diversion, Appellant testified: "I didn't
have nothing to do with Alta Ditch Company. I asked permission of Orem City is all" (Tr. 100-01). He further testified that he "did not" get permission from Alta (Tr. 101)
and that when he learned of the water agreements he "·ent
to Orem City, not to Alta, to work out the problem (Tr.
100). Such admissions by Appellant are supported by Alta
minutes (See Exs. 20, 21).
11.

Agreements 1cith respect to the Alta 1cater and
distribution facilities.

On l\Iarch 19, 1956, Respondents Alta Ditch & Canal
Company, Metropolitan 'Vater District of Orem and Orem
City entered into an agreement in "Titing entitled "Pipeline and 'Vater Rental Agreement" "·hich pro\ided for,
among other things, the construction of a pipeline from
Alta Springs to Orem City's head house and point of diversion on Alta Ditch and for the leasing to l\Ietropolitan
Water District of Orem and Orem City of the entire share
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of Alta in and to the waters of Alta Springs during the
period from October 15 to May 1 of the year following and
fo1· each year thereafter up to and including May 1, 1977.
The court below specifically found that this agreement was
duly authorized and executed by the parties, is valid and in
full force and effect and is binding upon Appellant (R. 92).
On May 16, 1958, Respondent Alta, Metropolitan
Water District of Orem and Orem City entered into a
Water Exchange Agreement in writing wherein it was
agreed, among other things, that Metropolitan Water Di&trict of Orem and Orem City would be entitled to the entire
share of Alta in and to the waters of Alta Springs during
the period from May 1 to October 31 of each year, and in
exchange therefor, Metropolitan Water Districtof Orem and
Orem City agreed to supply to Alta greater amounts of water
and in addition thereto to pay to it a cash consideration.
The court below found that this Water Exchange Agreement was duly authorized and executed by the parties. It
expired by its own terms on November 1, 1965. On June
28, 1966, the Respondents entered into a new agreement
embodying the terms of the old agreement dated May 16,
19G8 for a new ten year term, with some modifications.
Similarly, the court below specifically found that this
agreement dated June 28, 1966 was duly authorized and
executed by the parties, is valid and is in full force and
effect and binding upon the Appellant (R. 92).
Also pertinent on this appeal, inasmuch as Appellant
seeks to quiet title to a portion of the water and water
rights and use of the distribution facilities, is a loan agree-
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ment between Alta and the Srbate of Utah executed on August 6, 1956 (See Ex. 41). The agreement provides, among
other things, for the transfer of title by Alta in fee simple
of all real estate upon which its water system is constructed, the granting to the 'State of Utah of an easement
to use all of 1:Jhe distribution facilities of Alta, and the conveyiance, ass:ignment and quitcl1aim to the 'State of Utah of
all of the water and waiter rights of Alta in the klta Springs
and the distribution system. The State of Utah, now holding legal title to all of the property involved, is a necessary
party but has not been sued as a party in this proceeding.
1

Finally, Alta and Orem City entered into an additional
agreement on March 16, 1964. 'Through this Agreement,
the parties jointly expended approximately $32,000 in covering the Ailta Spring. This aotion was taken under threat
of the State of Utah to condemn the water supply (See Ex.
31) (Tr. 129..:.30). This agreement recites, among other
things (See Ex. 31) that "Orem and A'lta are owners as
tenants in common of Alta Springs, Ditch, pipeline, right
to use the water and water works, Orem being the owner
of 34.82 % and A1ta being the owner of 65.18 % of the same,
with Orem also owning 41 shares of Alta stock in said
64.18%.''
1

In summary, all of the Alta Spring winter water was
leased to Orem City in 1956. Also in 19 56, money was borrowed to improve the distribution system and title to the
water and other property rights was conveyed to the State
of Utah. In 1958, the balance of the water of Alta Spring
owned by Alta was 1eased to Orem City in exchange for
1
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cash and a greater amount of Deer Creek water. This
agreement was renewed in 1956. Only through these various agreements has Orem City been able to supply to Appellant the continuous flow of Alta Spring water which he
seeks through this proceeding. In 1964, an agreement was
signed to provide cover for the Alta Ditch WM.ch recited
that Orem City and Al.ta Ditch & Canal Company were the
owners as tenants in common of all 11igh.ts to use Alita Ditch
water and through the distribution system.
1

12.

Appellant had knowledge of, consented to and
benefited from the various agreements described
above.

In this connection, the Court specifically found:

(R.

93)

"Plaintiff was at all times aware of the Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement and the Water
Excihange Agreements involved herein. He consented thereto, made no objections thereto and benefited :therefrom."
This finding is not specifically attacked by Appellant
in statement of "Relief Sought on Appeal", in "Statement
of Points" or in "Argument" contaiined in his brief. The
finding is ampiy supported by evidence in the record. Since
this evidence is reviewed in some detail in argument under
Point II and Point III, it will not be reviewed separately
here.
13.

Evidence relating to claimed "estoppel" as against
Alta.
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The court specifically found ( R. 93) that "the evidence
does not contain facts from which findings could be made
to support plaintiff's (Appellant's) claim of estoppel
against defendant (Respondent) Alta Ditch & Canal Company". This finding of the Court likewise is not directly
attacked by Appellant, it is a correct and proper finding
and that renders this issue moot on this appeal.
14.

Evidence relating to "quiet title issue".

Similarly, the court specifically found (R. 93) that
"the evidence does not contain facts from which findings
could be made that plaintiff (Appellant) is entitled to quiet
title to any of the waters of Alta Springs". Similarly, this
finding is not attacked directly in the Appellant's brief, the
same is a proper finding and binding upon Appellant and
accordingly, it cannot be assailed on appeal.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I.

APPELLANT HAS NO AGREEMENT OF ANY
KIND WITH ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMPANY WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FACILITIES OF, OR WATER DISTRIBUTED BY,
OREM CITY.
II.

APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE VARIOUS
WATER AGREEMENTS AND IS BOUND BY
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
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III.
APPELLANT RATIFIED THE VARIOUS WATER AGREEMENTS AND IS BOUND BY THE
PROVISIONS THEREOF.
IV.
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT NEITHER CONSENTED TO NOR
RATIFIED THE VARIOUS WATER AGREEMENTS, HE IS, NONETHELESS, BOUND BY
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.

v.
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO USE ALTA
DITCH WATER BASED UPON AN INTEREST
IN STOCK OF OLD ALTA.
VI.
APPELLANT HAS BEEN AFFORDED ALL
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO WHICH HE
IS ENTITLED AS A SHAREHOLDER OF
ALTA.
VII.
ALTA HAS NOT INTERFERED WITH
THREATENED TO INTERFERE WITH
PELLANT'S WATER SUPPLY AND NO
TOPPEL CAN ARISE AGAINST ALTA
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE.

OR
APESON
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VIII.
IN ANY EVENT, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A "QUIET TITLE" DECREE BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A NECESSARY PARTY.
ARGUMENT

Preliminary Statement
First, it is pertinent to note thait ithe bulk of Appell1ant's Brief is aimed at Respondent Alta Ditch & Canal
Company. This is an obvious exercise of the "red herring
technique" inasmuch as Appellant's quarrel is not w£th
Alta but with the other Respondents. For this reason, and
to place this matter in proper perspective, Alta's first poinrt
herein will relate to that quarrel between Appellant and the
other Respondents.
Second, the bulk of AppeUam's Brief, as 'applied to
Alta, is dedicated to the easily ,identifiable device of erecting and knocking down a straw man. In Points 1, 2 and 3,
AppeUant assumes tlrat the various agreements affecting
his water and water righlts were entered into over his "objection" and without his "consent". In the argument under
these points, Appellant wholly ignores the evidence in the
record and the specific findings of fact duly entered by the
courlt below. For this reason, this Respondent, in its second
and third points, will attempt to demonstrate both the initial consent of Appellant to such water agreements and
his subsequent ratification thereof. Certainly this court
1
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should be persuaded that Appellant either consented to or
ratified these agreements, as specifically found by the court
below, and in that event, all of Appellant's arguments under Points 1, 2 and 3 become fruitless.
POINT I.
APPELLANT HAS NO AGREEMENT OF ANY
KIND WITH ALTA DITCH & CANAL COMP ANY WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF FACILITIES OF, OR WATER DISTRIBUTED BY,
OREM CITY.
The following facts stand uncontroverted in the record
in this matter. Appellant's property, upon which he seeks
to use the water here involved, stands high on the Orem
Bench. Orem City diverts its decreed share of Alta waters
into a 14 inch culinary line from Alta Ditch at point above
Appellant's property. Appellant's pipeline, discussed above,
is connected to this Orem City Hne. Alta's share of the
Alta Ditch water flows on down the Alta Ditch to a point
approximately two miles from and 250 feet below Appellant's property where it is there diverted to irrigate lands
of Alta shareholders (Tr. 126-7). The other shareholders
of Alta (except James Ferguson who has an independently
decreed culinary right) purchase their culinary water from
Orem City (Tr. 289). They do not take or use any irrigation water from the 14 inch Orem City line. They all divert
their Alta water for irrigation purposes from Alta Ditch at
the point approximately 250 feet below and two miles from
Appellant's property (Tr. 126-7, 289). 'Dhis is true even
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of the water taken and used by Orem City as a shareholder
of Alta (Tr. 287-9). Appellant has never requested to take
Alta Ditch water at some place oither than such diversion
point below and at some distance from his property. Furthermore, Appellant has never requested a change of p'oint
of diversion through the Office of the State Engineer (Tr.
136). Beoouse of the topography of the area, it is not practical for him to take water at the point where diverted for
other shareholders of Alta because of the distance involved
and the costs required to pump the same back up to the
elevation of his property (Tr. 127-8).
But in addition to the foregoing, Appellant's particular
needs and desires could not be satisfied through use of the
water from Alta Ditch in a manner consistent with use by
other shareholders for at least two reasons, namely:
He desires to use the water for culinary purposes,
whereas other shareholders utilize the Alta water for irrigation and purchase water for household use from Orem
City (Tr. 129-31, 289). The contracts ito which reference
is made above for the covering of the Alta Ditch, one of
which resulted in transfer of legal title to waiter rights anJ
water facilities to the State of Utah were beneficial to Appellant in that they permiltted an improvement of the quality of the water for culinary purposes (Tr. 129-31).
1)

2) Appellant desires 1and needs a "conitinuous flow
of water" (Tr. 121). Burt for the water exchange agreements which are here under attack by Appellant, he would
have no way, as a shareholder of Alta, to obtain a continu-
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ous flow of water (Tr. 122). But for such agreements, he
would be entitled only to take water "on turn". His turn,
represented by his two shares of Alta stock, would authorize his use of the full stream of rthe Alta Ditch for 83 minutes every eight days and eight hours (Tr. 299). This
would create two problems :
a)

His pipeline is not sufficiellltly large even to carry
the complete flow of Alta Ditch waters, and;

b)

The pipe does not have sufficient capacity to store
enough water to satisfy his needs during the eight
days and eight hours in which he would be entitled to no water whatsoever as a stockholder of
Alta (Tr. 121-5).

This second problem is illustrated by the period in
1966 when the summer water agreement expired, and for
a short period of time, all parties with a shareholder's interest in the Alta water, including Orem City, were required to revert to turns. During that time, it was necessary for Appellant to request an "out of turn" filling of his
pipe (Tr. 269) . During this short period of time, Alta accommodated AppeUant and periodically interrupted the
turn of other shareholders to fill his pipe as a courtesy to
him. Otherwise, he would have been without water (Tr;
275).
1

Hence, the uncontroverted evidence demonstrates that
Appellant has needs for and desires water and water rights
to which he is not entitled as a shareholder of Alta. For
that reason, Appellant connected to the Orem City culinary
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pipeline. In attaching to this pipe and diverting water
through the same, Appellant did not deal with Alta. He
did not request the consent of any representative of Alta
but dealt only and exclusively wilth Orem City (Tr. 100-01).
When queried as his reason for not contacting Alta, Appellant testified (Tr. 101-2) :
"Q. You had what you claim was a deal of
some sort with Orem City, you were getting your
water so you didn't communicate with or bother
Alta Ditch?

"A.

That's right.

"Q.

You didn't have any reason to?

"A.

No."

He further testified (Tr. 100-01) :
And you don't claim any consent by Alta
Ditch to that transaction or any knowledge on their
part of that transaction?
"Q.

"A. I didn't have nothing to do with Alta
Ditch Company. I asked permission of Orem City
is all."
During all of the years here involved (1948 through
1966), Appellant made no claim or demand of any kind
with respect to the subject matter of this ·lawsuit against
Alta until immediately before filing suit .(Tr. 177). His
quarrel was only with Orem City (Tr. 100-02). It follows
as a matter of course that Appellant's claim in this proceeding is not against Alta but agiainst Orem City. His rights,
if any, arise by virtue of a claimed oral agreement with
Orem City of which Alta was not and is not a party. With-
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out the water agreements which he here attacks, even Orem
City would be powerless to afford him a "continuous flow"
of Alta water. However, it is understandable that, faced
with formidable obstacles in proving and enforcing his
agreement with Orem City, he has turned in this eleventh
hour to the innocent bystander, Alta Ditch & Canal Company. For all of the foregoing reasons, it follows that his
rights and remedies in this proceeding, if any, run against
Orem City only.
POINT II.
APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE VARIO US
WATER AGREEMENTS AND IS BOUND BY
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
In the first three points of Argument in Appellant's
Brief, he ignores wholly the specific findings of the court
below, together with the supporting evidence. Most of the
evidence, which is uncontroverted, proves that Appellant
consented to the various water agreements which made it
possible for him to obtain his desired "continuous flow"
through his claimed agreement with Orem City. To support this assertion, we first discuss such findings, and parenthetically we menltion thJat they are not the subject of
any specific atltack in Appellant's Brief or in the statement
of relief sought through this appeal. Second, we relate the
evidence which moved the Trial Judge to make the findings
in favor of Alta.
1.

Findings -
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a) In Finding No. 11 ( R. 91-2) , the Trial Gou rt
specifically found that the agreement of March 19, 1956
was "duly authorized and executed by the parties thereto
and that it is valid and in full force and effect and is binding upon the plaintiff".
b) In Finding No. 12 (R. 92), the Trial Judge stated
that the agreement of May 16, 1958 was "duly authorized
and executed by the parities thereto and is valid and in full
force and effed and is binding upon the plaintiff".
c) Finding No. 14 (R. 93) by the Court below states
that "plaintiff was at all times aware of the Pipeline and
Water Rental Agreement and the Water Exchange Agreements involved herein. He consented thereto, made no objections thereto and benefited therefrom. * * * Said
Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement and Water Exchange
Agreements are valid and in full force and effect and are
binding upon the plaintiff." (Emphasis added.)
Upon these findings, the Court properly concluded (R.

94) :
a)

"That plaintiff consented to the water exchange
agreements in this action."

b)

"That the Pipeline and Water Rental Agreement
and the Water Exchange Agreements herein are
valid and in full force and effect and are binding
upon plaintiff."
1

Ini,tially, we respectfully submit that these specific
findings of fact 'and conclusions of law have not been at-
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tacked directly in Appelliant's Brief. Instead, he has chosen
to wholly ignore them. The rule which is applicable here
was set forth by this Court in Burton v. Zions Cooperative
Mercantile Institution, 122 Utah 360, 249 P. 2d 514, at page
366 of the Utah Reports as follows :
"There is a presumption that the judgment of
the Trial Court was correct, and every reasonable
intendment must be fodulged in favor of it; the
burden of affirmatively showing error is on the
party complaining thereof."
Again in In Re Lavell's Estate, Immerthal v. First Security Bank of Utah, et al., 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 372,
this Court applied this generally accepted doctrine applicable to attacks upon appeal to findings of fact made by the
Trial Court. There, contrary to the case at bar, the Appellant in his Brief referred specifically to the findings in
question and discussed them and the evidence sufficiently
to comply with the rule. However, the Court in that case
stated the principle which we submit is here applicable.
The language there is this :
"An appellant cannot be asked to go through
the transcript, showing how the testimony reported
on each page does not support the finding. Yet, insofar as is practicable, he must detail, with citation
to the record where appropriate, the particulars
wherein the evidence touching the finding is inconsistent therewith or is not of enough moment to
sustain it" (P. 258).
We submit that the Appellant here, by ignoring the
record, by pretending that the findings did not exist, and
by failing even to discuss them, forfeits any right to raise
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factual issues. In addition, his failure to mention any evidence upon which they are based, or to point out wherein
it is insufficient to support the Trial Court's findings
should require this Court ,to conclude that they are binding
upon Appellant and sufficient to support the judgment.
In support of the foregoing conclusions, we believe that
Lepasiotes v. Dinsdale, et al., 121 Utah 359, 242 P. 2d 297
is apposite. In that case, this Court reiterated this well
known appellate concept:
"As to any prejudicial error claimed, none of
the many rulings on admission of evidence was assigned specifically on appeal as constituting prejudicial error, so that any decision thereon would require discussion of all objections, no one of
which plaintiff has had an opportunity to meet in
her brief because of such non-designation. Therefore, we feel constrained not to review those matters which plaintiff cannot defend against because
not ca1led to attention by her opponents" (P. 360).
See ·also Sandall v. Sandall, 57 Utah 150, 193 Pac.
1093 at page 155.
Also of controlling significance is the language in
Utah-Idaho Sugar Company V. Salt Lake County, et al.,
60 Utah 491, 210 Pac. 106 where this Court stated:
"While it is not only permissible but often commendable for counsel to .group their assignments
and consider kindred subjects together, yet when
the findings of fact are assa:iled, which, in the nature of things at least, cannot all, nor even a large
pol'tion thereof, be contrary to the evidence, counsel
must point out in ivhat particulars the findings are
not supported by the evidence; and it is not suffi-
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cient merely to make the assignments specific, but
if they are relied on they must be specifically referred to in the brief, so that we may know what
points are relied on, and where we may look in the
record for the evidence or the lack of evidence with
respect ,thereto" (P. 504; Emphasis added).
This doctrine was dishonored here by Appellant and
that should require a summary affirmance of the judgment
of the Trial Court.
Assuming arguendo that any issues are raised by Appellant, the findings made by the Trial Judge are adequately supported by evidence and must stand. In "Relief
Sought on Appeal" at page 2 of Appellant's Brief, Appellant seeks only reversal of that part of the judgment as
against Alta refusing to award to him a decree "quieting
his title" to water of Alta Spring. We submit that this is
an issue in which legal matters, as contrasted with equitable issues, prevail. This Court so he'ld in Holland v. Wilson,
et al., 8 U. (2d) 11, 327 P. 2d 250. There, the plaintiff
sought to quiet equitable title to property, to declare in him
the righlt of possession, and to grant a restraining order
against the defendant. In that case, this Court said:
"We are further of the opinion that although
histotically an action to quiet title was originally
equitable and the law courts had no jurisdiction to
grant such relief, that situation does not prevail in
this state. Formerly equity courts afforded relief
because there was no adequate remedy at law. In
this jurisdiction, however, there is an adequate
remedy provided by statute under the provisions of
Chapter 40 of Title 78, USCA 1953" (P. 14).

26
Although not specifically raised under "Relief Sought
on Appeal", Appellant argues throughout his Brief that
certain water and water exchange agreements are not binding upon him and he states thwt this Court should declare
that those agreements are not binding upon him. Any
judgment so declaring would fall within the scope of Title
78, Chapter 33, UCA, 1953. Section 9 thereof states that:
"When a proceeding under this chapter involves the determination of an issue of fact, such
issue may be tried and determined in the same
manner as issues of fact are tried and determined
in other civil actions in the court in which the proceeding is pending."
It follows that the issues involved in this matter relating to said contracts such as knowledge, consent, benefits,
dealing with the wrong parties, etc., likewise are mixed

questions of law and fact and this Court has no power to
weigh the facts except as to their sufficiency to sustain the
Trial Court's findings.
The rule applicable when this Court is asked to review
findings of fact of a Trial Judge ;sitting without a jury in
a law case was enunciated as early as 1898 in Isaac N.
Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Uta!h 240, 51 P. 980. There the
Court stated:
1

"It is urged for the Appellant that the evidence
is insufficient 1Jo justify these findings. This, however, is a question of fact in a case at law, and
therefore we have no power 1Jo consider the justness
of the findings. The only province of this court in
such a case is to ascertain whether there is any
legitimate proof which supports them, and, if there
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is, then we are conclusively bound by them, regardless of whether or not the findings are supported by
a preponderonce of the testimony, or whether, in
our judgment, on all the evidence, they are justified" (P. 242).
This doctrine has been reiterated by this Court in
numerous subsequent cases. See e.g.: Ogden Packing &
Provision Co. v. Tooele Meat & Storage Co., 41 Utah 92,
124 P. 333; Osborn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 P. 435;
Scott v. Austin, 47 Utah 248, 152 P. 1178; Valiotis v. UtahApex Min. Co., 55 Utah 151, 184 P. 802; Western Union
Tel Co. v. Matthews, et al., 74 Utah 495, 505, 280 P. 729;
Van Leeuwen v. Huffaker, 78 Utah 521, 528, 5 P. 2d 714;
Vadner v. Rozzelle, 88 Uta:h 162, 164, 45 P. 2d 561, rehearing
denied 88 Utah 172, 54 P. 2d 1214; Greco v. Gentile, 88
Utah 255, 53 P. 2d 1155; Harper v. Tri-State Motors, Inc.,
et al., 90 Utah 212, 222, 58 P. 2d 18, rehearing denied 90
Utah 226, 63 P. 2d 1056.
1

In this case we can, without admitting that the record
so shows, make one further assumption and that is that
equitable issues predominated. Even with tlhat assumption
as a premise, the findings of the Courit below must still be
sustained. The rule applicable under such an assumed situation is set forth in this language found in Sidney Stevens
Implement Co. v. South Ogden Land, Building & Improvement Co., et al., 20 Utah 267, 58 P. 843:
"All of the testimony touching this finding,
consists of oral statements of witnesses and was
conflicting. In such instances, the Trial Judge having the witnesses before him can observe their deportment upon rthe stand, and is therefore in a bet-
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ter position to judge their credibility and the weight
of the evidence, than are the judges of the Appell1ate Court. For this reason, although the Supreme
Court 'has power, under Sec. 9, Art. 8 of the
Constitution to review facts in an equity case,'
(McKay v. Farr, 15 Utah 261) stil'l, unless the evidence is clearly insufficient to sustain the findings,
they will not be disturbed by the Appellarte Court"
(P. 280; Emphasis added).
See Accord: Escamilla v. Pingree, et al., 44 Utah 421, 141
P. 103, L.R.A. 1915 B, 475; Beesley v. Boardman, 50 Utah
149, 166 P. 991.
As the next step under the two foregoing assumptions,
we now turn to a review of the evidence upon which these
unchallenged findings are based. Although Appellant stated
on direct examinaJtion that he had no notice of shareholder
meetings regarding the water agreements and that he had
not consented thereto, he was forced, on cross examination,
to correct that testimony. Appel'lant admitted that as early
as 1956, immediately after the signing of the first ·water
Exchange Agreement, he was aware of the agreement (Tr.
86-7). Moreover, he admitted thaJt on June 14, 1956, and
prior to the approval of that agreement, he personally
signed Exhibit 16 (Tr. 88). Exhibit 16 is "Waiver of No·
tice of Special Meeting of Stockholders 1of Alta Ditch &
Oanal Company" which provided (See Ex. 16) :
"And we do hereby waive all requirements of
the statutes of the State of Utah and the Articles
of Incorporation of Alta Ditch & Canal Company,
both as to the notice of this meeting, and the purpose thereof, and consent to the transaction of any
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and all business that may come before the meeting,
including the following matters:

"*

* *

" ( 3) For the purpose of taking all necessary
further action in connection with the pending pipeline loan of this company with Utah Water & Power
Board; and
" ( 4) To transact any and all other business
which may come before the meeting."
He further testified that on March 10, 1966 he personally signed "Waiver and Notice of Annual Stockholders
Meeting" (Tr. 89) which provided in part (See Ex. 17):
"We further consent and agree that in addition
to the elections and the regular business to come
before said annual stockholders meeting that the
matter of the pipeline and water rental agreement
between the Metropolitan Water District of Orem
City, on the one hand, and Alta Ditch & Canal Company on the other, may also be considered, acted
upon and concluded a:t said meeting; and also all
matters pertaining to the pipeline contract with the
state."
Appellant's only attempt to explain away his signing of 'the
Waiver was as follows (Tr. 89) :
"A.

I didn't understand it that way or I would

never have signed iit.
"Q.

But you did sign it, sir?

"A.

I did sign it."
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Hence, it is uncontroverted that exhibits 16 and 17
were presented to and signed by the AppeUant prior to the
meetings at which 'the pipeline construction agreement and
the initial Water Exchange Agreement were acted upon
and approved by Alta. We submit that this evidence alone
is sufficient to support the findings of the Courit below.
In addition to the foregoing admissions, Appellant testified that he affirma:tively asserted his rights as a shareholder of Alta, including a demand to examine the minutes
of the meetings of the shareholders and of the Board of
Directors (Tr. 106). As a stockholder, he received either
dividends or assessments in each year (Tr. 116-7). Appellant knew that .A:lta was getting revenue from the Water
Exchange Agreements with Orem City (Tr. 116-7). In
dividend years during ,the time of the Water Exchange
Agreements, operating expenses were paid first from the
revenue before the dividends were voted (Tr. 311). In dividend years, Appellant did not contribute to the operating
expenses of rthe Company, but instead permitted these revenue funds to be used in defraying corporate expenses
which otherwise would have required assessments (Tr.
117). Appellan't admitted that he had notice of the shareholders meetings which were held over the years. His only
justification in not participating more actively was that
"I didn't go to all of them" (Tr. 120). Although Appellant
claimed he did not :attend all of the meetings, his activity
in this regard is illustr:ated by Exhibit 18, minutes of stockholders meeting dated March 21, 1962 which recite: "A
Motion to re-elect the officers as now constituted was made
by Dean Gillman and seconded by Dean Park".
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Appellant further stated that as early as 1956, he attended a meeting after he admittedly "knew they had sold"
his water and he "wanted to find out about it" (Tr. 87).
Notices of all meetings of the shareholders of Alta Ditch &
Canal Company involving all of the issues here before the
court were mailed to all shareholders, including Park (Tr.
304). Those notices were personally prepared and mailed
by Vivian P. Hales, who appeared and testified at the trial
(Tr. 304). She personally has attended every meeting of
Alta Ditch & Canal Company since 1922 with the exception
of one where the minutes of the meeting were kept by the
wife of one of the other shareholders (Tr. 306). At such
shareholder meetings, of which AppeUant was given due
notice, the business of the corporation was transaclej, including the business relating to the Water Exchange Agreements, the monies received therefrom and their application
either for payment of expenses or distribution as dividends
(Tr. 308-9). Mrs. Hales further testified that to her personal knowledge Appellant had been treated precisely as
was every other shareholder of Alta and had been given
notice, as were all other shareholders, of the meetings at
which the corporate business was authorized and transacted
(Tr. 310-12).
In short, the evidence is both overwhelming and uncon troverted that from the time Appellant became a shareholder of Alta Ditch & Canal Company, he was aware of
its corporate action and he expressly consented to the water
and Water Exchange Agreements which he now, at this
late date seeks to attack. This being true, the various

'
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arguments contained under Points 1, 2 and 3 of his Brief
:fall far back of merit.
POINT III.
APPELLANT RATIFIED THE VARIOUS
WATER EXCHANGE AGREEMENTS AND IS
BOUND BY THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
The evidence showing that Appellant was fully aware
of the water, water rights and Water Exchange Agreements is outlined above. The various agreements benefited
Appellant directly. The very Water Exchange Agreements
which he now seeks to destroy made it possible for him to
obtain, through claimed agreement with Orem City, the
"continuous flow" which he desired (Tr. 122). He specifically admitted that the various agreements worked to
his advantage and that he benefited thereby (Tr. 129-30).
Under these admitted facts, the Court's specific finding that Appellant "made no objections" to the various
agreements and "benefited therefrom" (See Finding No.
14, R. 93) is not only supported by evidence by any conceivable test, but any other finding would have been factually and legally improper.
The legal effect of the course of action followed by
Appellant is enunciated by Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Vol. 13, Chapter 58, Sec. 5862 as follows:
"A stockholder who, with knowledge of the
facts, himself has given his consent to, or acquiesced
in, acts of the directors or other corporate officers,
or of majority stockholders, cannot ordinarily at-
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tack such aets afterwards and this applies equally
well to ultra vires acts. * * * So a stockholder
cannot attack a wrongful or ultra vires act, where he
has accepted pecuniary benefits thereunder with
knowledge of the facts. * * * It is immaterial
whether the conduct relied on be considered an estoppel, ratification, election or the assumption of a
position inconsistent with an attack."
Here, pretermitting consent, Appellant admittedly accepted pecuniary benefits from the very corporate action
which he here seeks to escape. By accepting the enrichment, he ratified the corporate acts and is bound by them.
Again, this makes all of the arguments set forth under
Points 1, 2 and 3 of Appellant's Brief irrelevant to the
issues herein involved.
POINT IV.
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT APPELLANT NEITHER CONSENTED TO NOR
RATIFIED THE VARIOUS WATER AGREEMENTS, HE IS, NONETHELESS, BOUND BY
THE PROVISIONS THEREOF.
This point is argued because the principles involved
require that the judgment be affirmed regardless of
whether Appellant had consented rto or ratified the agreements involved. This for the reason that the agreements
are still binding upon him. In the pleadings, Appellant
both affirmatively alleges and admits that Alta is a corporation of the State of Utah (R. 3, 34). It is, therefore,
necessary to examine the statutes of the State of Utah to
determine whether or not a corporation has the legal power
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to exchange its water without the consent of every shareholder.
The Articles of Incorporation of Alta (See Ex. 7)
were fi'led with the Secretary of State of Utah on November 26, 1946. They do not state expressly whether the corporation created thereby is a corporation for pecuniary
profit or a non-profit corporation. We will, therefore, examine the statutes applying to both types of corporations.
1

The statutes in effect at the time of incorporation are
of special significance because in Fower, et al. vs. Provo
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., et al., 99 Utah 267, 101 P.
2d 375, this Court stated:
"It is well settled that the Articles of Incorporation of a corporation form the basis of a contract
among others, between the corporation anj its
stockholders. lit is also well settled that 'the provi-

sions contained in the Constitution and Statutes are
as rnuch a part of the Articles of Incorporation as
though they were expressly copied therein'." (P.
270; Emphasis added.)

The applicable Non-Profit Corporation Statute in force
at the date of incorporation and at the date of the Agreements here involved stated in pertinenrt part that "unless
otherwise provided in the Articles of Incorporation or ByLaws, upon consent of two-thirds of the members of the
corporation present at a meeting duly called and held", the
corporation may "mortgage, encumber, lease, sell or convey
any real or personal property of the corporation. * * *"
(16-6-9, U.C.A. 1953 - Repealed by Laws of 1963, Ch. 17,
Sec. 93). Appellant claims no procedural defect, admits
1
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notice of meetings and does not claim that any other shareholder lacked knowledge or failed to consent to the contracts involved. It follows that ithe statute quoted granted
to the corporation the right to enter into a W ater Exchange
Agreement upon consent of two-<thirds of the shar~holders.
The same result would follow if the present non-profit corporation statute were applied. See Title 16, Chapter 6,
Sections 20 and 61, U. C. A. 1953, as amended in 1963.
This Court in the recent case of Gunnison-Fayette Canal
Company vs. Gunnison Irrigation Company, 448 P. 2d 707,
stated that:
1

"The Nonprofit Corporation Act found in Sec.
16-6-20, U. C. A. 1953 (Repliacement Vol. 2, 1967
Pocket Supplement), applies to mutual irrigation,
canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies." (Emphasis added.)
The present act specifiml1y applies to "mutual >irrigation,
canal, ditch, reservoir and water companies and water
users' associations organized and existing under the laws
of this State on the effective date of this Act. See 16-6-20,
U. C. A. 1953. The Act took effect on July 1, 1963, before
the 1964 ditch improvement contract and the 1966 Water
Exchange Agreement which are discussed above and which
Appellant, through this appeal, seeks to destroy.
Similarly, if it were to be contended that Alta is a
corporation for pecuniary profit, the applicable statutes
confer upon it the r,ight to dispose of either real or personal
properiy without the consent of all stockholders. Title 18,
Chapter 2, Sec. 16, U. C. A. 1953, in effect ,at the date of
incorporation of Alta and the current statute as contained
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in Title 16, Chapter 10, Sec. 4, U. C. A. 1953, as amended
in 1961, also authorizes such a conveyance.
In argument under Point 2, Appellant cites, quotes
from and discusses at length numerous cases, all of which
are interesting, but none of which has any application to
his position in this case.* None of this authority decided
whether or not a mutual water company has the legal power
to exchange certain water for a greater volume of water
from another source with the consent of more than twothirds, but not all of the outstanding stock. However, in a
case not cited by Appellant, this Court laid to rest that
particular issue. In Beggs, et al. vs. Myton Canal & Irr.
Co., et al., 54 Utah 120, 179 Pac. 984, the Court was considering the powers and privileges of a mutual irrigation
company. There, minority stockholders (with proportionate interests much greater than Appellant here) filed an
action to annul an agreement through which the irrigation
company disposed of all of its water rights and other property asserting that the contract was void and ultra vires
and that "the corporation had no power to sell or dispose

of its property" without the consent of all of its shareholders, precisely the position here asserted by Appellant.
Hence, the doctrine of Beggs is here controlling. The Beggs
case was even stronger on behalf of the plaintiff than is the
case at bar in that the former involved an outright sale of
all water and water rights and all other property of the
"mutual irrigation company". On the contrary, the case
at bar involves only lease and exchange agreements through
*A brief discussion distinguishing these cases is set forth in Appendix

II.
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which shareholders of Alta received a greater amount of
water, together with a payment of cash, whieh admittedly
were of cons~derable benefit to all shareholders, including
Appellant.
In disposing of the Plaintiff's contention in Beggs,
this Court stated:
"In our opinion, counsel's argument is not tenable. * * * Considering the section as a whole,
the manifest legislative intent is that all corporations in this state may, through their directors and
upon confirmation by a vote of a majority in
amount of outstanding stock, dispose of the corporate property when such disposition is not provided
for in the Articles of Incorpomtion. And when the
Articles of Incorporation provide that the property
of th1e corporation may be sold by the directors or
by the shareholders sales made in accordance with
such provisions will be binding UP'On the corpo:mtion. Whether such corporation be organized for
mining purposes, or for other purposes, under the
general incorporation laws of the state, our statute
gives private corporations the power to sell and
dispose of their property upon confirmation by a
majority in the amount of the outstanding stock.
No further authority need be invoked in this case."
(Emphasis added.)
We respectfully submit that, as this Court said in
Beggs, no further authority need be invoked to support the
Trial Court's judgment in this case. Most assuredly, Appellant, with approximately one percent of the stock of
Alta, does not have a veto power over the action of the
corporiation approved by all other stockholders and for the
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mutual benefit of the corporation and all of its stockholders.
POINT V.
APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO USE ALTA
DITCH WATER BASED UPON AN INTEREST IN STOCK OF OLD ALTA.
The claim asserted in the Brief that Appellant has an
interest to use Alta water based upon ,an interest in stock
of Old Alta is contrary to his theory as set out in 'the pleadings before the Court below. In his Reply to Counterclaim
(R. 34), Appellant admitted that "his rights to use the
water of Alta Springs are limited to his rights as a shareholder of Alta Ditch & Canal Company".
However, moving to the merits of this claim, the record clearly demonstrates that this admission was compelled
by the facts involved and by 'the prior holdings of the Distric Court in Civil No. 15,460 which is discussed in detail
above. As is set forth above in the statement of facts and
in Appendix I, the Court in the prior case held that the
shareholders of the old defunct corporation did not become
tenants in common to the underlying assets of the old corpomtion, including the water rights, that they were not
necessary parties in that action, that all of the rights of
the shareholders of the old defunct corporation had been
conveyed to the new corporation, that the new corporation
held the equitable interests in the underlying property and
that the technical legal title stood in the old corporation.
It further held that the only remedy of equitable owners
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against the old corporation was through mandamus to compel the directors of the old corporation to convey technical
legal title to the new corpomtion.
Interestingly, Appellant was ,a party to that proceeding and was one of the Director-Trustees holding legal title
with a duty to convey the same to the new corporation.
(Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Stipulation; quoted iin pertinent part in Appendix I). Appellant admitted at trial that he had signed
the Stipulation for amendment of :the judgment "Individually and as Director-Trustees of Alta Ditch & Canal Company, a defunct corporation". (See Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Stipulation, Tr.117-8).
In asserting this claim, Appellant therefore finds himself in a wholly untenable position. He seeks, contrary to
law, to attack collaterally the judgment in case No. 15,460
by which he is bound. He was a Director-Trustee of the old
corpomtion and was thus under the specific order of 'the
Court to convey legal title to Alta Ditch & Canal Company
and to Orem City, the equitable owners thereof. He, together with fellow Director-Trustees, failed to comply With
the mandatory order of the Court. Hence, any interest
which he contends he retained in the old defunct corporation must find its roots in his contempt of Court in failing
or refusing to obey its affirmative order to convey away
the interest involved. We submit that AppeHant cannot be
permitted to benefit from his contemptuous conduct. Such
a result would be unthinkable on the grounds asserted.
Furthermore, when consideration is .given to the supporting
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doctrines of res judicata and estoppel by judgment, a holding to that effect would be tragically unjust.
POINT VI.
APPELLANT HAS BEEN AFFORDED ALL
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES TO WHICH HE
IS ENTITLED AS A SHAREHOLDER OF
ALTA.
The record in this matter contains no evidence that
Appellant was deprived of any right or privilege afforded
to other srtockholders of Al'ta. He admitted that he had
been tendered dividends over the years as had other shareholders (Tr. 95-6). He was never refused his proper water
turn represented by his shares of stock (Tr. 98-9). He
made no unsatisfied request of Alta with respect to his
connection to and use of water supplied by Orem City (Tr.
101-2). He received either dividends or assessments each
year as did other shareholders (Tr. 116-7). No request for
change in point of diversion has been denied (Tr. 128). He
received notices of the various shareholders meetings over
the years (Tr. 120).
Appellant seeks to found some rights on the fact thart
during a portion of the time here involved he returned
dividends which had been mailed to him. However, the
minutes of the stockholders meeting of March 21, 1962
(Ex. 18) , place this matter in proper perspective. They
read:
"A motion to take under advisement about
keeping the dividend of Dean Park rather than pay
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it to him. Mr. Park asked us as a favor to keep
whatever dividend payable to him in the Alta treasury."
Certainly he cannot parlay Alta's compliance with this
request into affirmative rights on his part.
From Appelliant's tes timony, it is perfectly obvious
that he has been afforded every right and privilege to
which he was entitled as a shareholder of Alta Ditch &
Canal Company. His testimonial admissions are consistent
with the affirmative testimony of the Secretary of the
Company, Mrs. Hales (See Tr. 303-11). From this record,
it is apparent why the Court below concluded (Conclusions
of Law No. 8, R. 94):
1

"That plaintiff has been afforded all rigihts and
privileges to which he is entitled as a shareholder
of defendant Alta Ditch & Canal Company."
Appellant on this appeal has not in his Brief challenged the validity of this conclusion. It is inescapable
from the evidence in the record and must stand.
POINT VII.
ALTA HAS NOT INTERFERED WITH
THREATENED TO INTERFERE WITH
PELLANT'S WATER SUPPLY AND NO
TOPPEL CAN ARISE AGAINST ALTA
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE.

OR
APESON

Under Point 4 of his Brief commencing at page 25,
Appellant argues that Alta "fa estopped from interfering
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with AppeUant's water supply". Tihis argument is as
stra:ined as it is foreign to the record in this matter. There
is no evidence in the record of any interference by Alta or
any threat of such interference with Appellant's water supply. The record condusively demonstrates that it has nothing whatsoever to do with his water supply. As is set forth
above in detail, witli appropriate references to the record,
Appe1lant's water supply has been taken from the 14 inch
culinary line of Orem City. Alta has no interest 1in or control over the use or distribution of water from the Orem
culinary water line.
At page 5 of Appellant's Briief, the statement is made
that "from 1949 to the date of filing this suit the Appellant
diverted his share of Alta Spring water through the Orem
City pipeline to his system constructed at an expense exceeding $24,000.00." This statement is not a fair summary
of the evidence on this subject. On cross examination, Appellant admitted that "much of the expense" was "not involved with the installation of the pipeline, but the creation
of a spvinkling system and water works sys,tem beyond the
end of the pipe". He further admitted that a substantial,
but undesignated, portion of such system could not reasonably be claimed against any defendant in the law suit (Tr.
103-4). In any event, the cost 'of the diversionary system
is wholly irrelevant as fo Alta because it was never advised
about nor is it charged with such costs.
1

But in addition, Appellant admitted on cross examination that he did not advise any representative of Alta how
much the diversionary works cost or who he expected to
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pay for the costs whatever they be. He also admitted that
his connection was with the Orem City line, not the Alta
water system and that he did not advise Alta or its representatives that he intended to take the water from the
Orem City pipeline without paying for itt (Tr. 133-5).
These admiss ions are corroborated by the testimony of
Alta's President, James Ferguson, called as a witness for
Appellant, who stated that the connection was made to the
line of Orem City; that the subject of costs was never discussed; that no daim was asserted agaJinst Alta; and that
all substantial actions of Alta were reflected in its minutes
and no claim by Appellant against Alta is shown therein
(Tr. 175-7).
1

From this evidence obtained through Appellant himself and through Alta's President called as hiis witness, the
court below found ( R. 93) :
1

"The evidence does not contain facts from
which findings could be made to support plaintiff's
claim of estoppel as against defendant Alta Ditch
& Canal Company, Metropolitan Water District of
Orem and Orem City, and the court finds for said
defendants and against the plaintiff on plaintiff's
claims of estoppel."
From these findings, the court concluded (R. 94) :
"That the alleged estoppel claimed by the plaintiff does not run against defendants Alta Ditch &
Canal Company, Metropolitan Water District of
Orem and Orem City, or any of 'them."
Again, Appellant does not specifically cltallenge this
finding of the Court. We submit, under the authorities
stated above, that he is bound thereby.
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The estoppel claim, under the record in this case, is so
far-fertched that we assume that it must have been here
asserted in despair. No other reason is apparent. The
only Utah case cited in Appellant's Brief on this subject is
Mary Jane Stevens Co. vs. First National Building Co., 89
Utah 456, 57 P. 2d 1099. There, the court specifically refused to apply "estoppel", starting: "It usually requires
some affirmative act of silence where there is a duty to
speak to raise an estoppel". The court there cited with
approval and relied upon the teachings of the following
cases:
a) Finch, et al. vs. Theiss, 107 N. E. 898. There the
Supreme Court of Illinois said :
"There was no element of fraud on the part of
appellant. 'There must be deception and change of
conduct in consequence, in order to estop a party
from showing the truth.' Davidson vs. Young, 38
Ill. 145. In Mullaney vs. Duffy, 145 Ill. 559, 33 N.
E. 750, it was said, where it is sought to establish
an estoppel from the silence of a party who in
equity and good conscience sh ould have spoken, it
is essential that the parity sought to be estopped
should have had knowledge of the facts, and the
other party have been ignorant of the truth, and
h'ave been misled into doing that which he would
not have done but for such silence."
1

1

b) Bright, et al. vs. Allen, 203 Pa. 394, 53 A. 251.
There the Court stwted the rule as follows :

"We can see no evidence of any act upon the
part of plaintiffs to encourage defendant to build
on this portion of the wall. The doctrine of 'the
cases cited does not sustain the conclusion reached.
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Thus in Hill vs. Epley, 31 Pa. 331, it appears plainly
that the doctriine of estoppel can only arise where
the conduct of a party has been such as to induce
action by another; that the par:ty setting up the estoppel must have acted on the faith of such conduct;
that he must have been positively encouraged to act,
or that he must lrave had a mistaken opinion respecting his title; and that the party to be estopped
must have been aware of this mistake, and if he
had not such knowledge Ms silence does not estop
him." (Emphasi,s :added.)
In Wellsville East Field Irr. Co., et al. vs. Lindsay
Land & Livestock Co., et al., 104 Utah 448, 137 P. 2d 634,
the Utah Supreme Court described the doctrine of estoppel
as applied to interests in water rights and water distribution systems. It saJid :
"The defense of esiJoppel must fail because
facts setting up an estoppel have not been proved.
There is no showing of fraud, deceit, or reliance on
the conduct of the plaintiff to the detriment of the
defendants, etc., as required to make out estoppel.
" 'The elements requisite for estoppel are substantially those necessary to found an action for
deceit, with the exception of the element of knowledge of falsi'ty.' Weil, Water Rights in Western
States, § 593. Weil further points out in § 594
that 'Estoppel may :a:riise where the necessary facts
are present. But the daim is usually based on silence, standing by, and similar omission to act while
another is incurring expense in arranging hostile
plans'" (Emphasis added).
1

Hutchins, Selected Problems in the Law of Water in
the West, has this to say :
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"An estoppel involves turpitude, fraud - such
as misleading statements or acts, or concealment of
facts by •.silence - with the result that one party is
induced or ·led by the words, conduct or silence of
another party to do things that he otherwise would
not have done. The intent to deceive muslt have existed, or rut least there must have been an imputation that the party against whom an esltoppel is
claimed expeoted the other party to act. Unless
there is some degree of turpitude, a court of equity
will not estop one from asserting his title where the
effect is to for/ eit his property and trans/ er its enioyment to another." (P. 402; Emphasis added.)
Nio such facts exist in the case here on review. There
certainly is no evidence of fraud or deceit on rthe part of
Alta or any of its representatives. Admittedly, they did
not encourage the Appellant to enter into his claimed
agreement with Orem Ci'ty to construct his pipeline or to
tap or use Orem City water. Appellant at 'the trial did not
even claim any act or omissi on of Alta upon which he relied, to his detriment, or otherwise. In short, none of the
several elements of estoppel are present here as against
Alta and the specific and unchallenged findings and conclusions of the court below should not be disturbed.
1

POINT VIII.
IN ANY EVENT, APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A "QUIET TITLE" DECREE BECAUSE OF THE ABSENCE OF A NECESSARY
PARTY.
The only issue raised by Appellant as against Alta in
his Brief under designation "Relief Sought on Appeal" is
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to reverse that part of the judgment of the Trial Court
denying him a decree quieting his title to water of Alta
Spring.
Since Appellant apparently seeks to have this Court
quiet title to the water, water rights and facilities involved,
it is pertinent to note that this remedy is impossible by
reason of his failure to join an indispensable party - the
State of Utah which holds legal title to the use of water,
water rights and diversl:ion facilities involved. The construction loan agreement discussed above (see Ex. 31)
conveys title to all of ,such property rto the State of Utah.
On the last page thereof is a certificate of James B. Ferguson and Eugene Crandall that the same was signed by
Alta by authority of a resolution of its sitockholders and
that the corporation duly had executed the same. Exhibit
16, admittedly bearing the signature of Appellant (Tr. 88)
is a Waiver of Notice of Special Meeting of Stockholders
of Alta called for the specific purpose, among other things,
of taking "all necessary action in connection with the pending pipeline loan of this company with Utah Water &
Power Board". Hence, the uncontroverted evidence establishes that Appellant consented to the transfer of all of the
water and water rights of Alta to tile State of Utah. It
follows that the State of Utah is a necessary party if the
Appellant seriously seeks to quiet title to the property
rights involved.
1

Rule 19 of the Ufah Rules of Civil Procedure titled
"Necessary J oinder of Parties" reads in pertinent part:

"(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to
the provisions of Rule 23 (Class Actions) and of
subdivision (b) of this Rule (J·ainder of Parties not
Indispensable) , Persons having a joint interest shall
be made parties and be joined on the same side as
plaintiffs or defendants."
In commenting on Rule 19 (a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure which is similar to the Utah Rule, Profiessor Moore in his Treatise on Federal Practice, Vol. 3,
2nd Edition, page 2145 contrasts permissive joinder with
the compulsory joinder required by Rule 19 with the following language :
"Rule 19, on the other hand, deals with compulsory joinder of parties - parties whose presence
before the court is conditionally necessary or indispensable. Indispensable parties must, in every case,
be before the court."
On page 2209, Professor Moore continues:
"But the concept of indispensability goes beyond Federal jurisdict~on and touches the very
power or right of the court to make ·an equitable
adjudication, where an indispensable party is not
before it."
Professor Moore then explains that the defense of
failure to join an indispensable party may be made by responsive pleading or wt the trial. Indeed, the matter is of
sufficient significance to permit its raising for the first
time on appeal. Professor MOlore states at pages 2211-2:
"And the matter is so vital that an Appell'ate
Courit, Sua Sponte if necessary, may consider it although the point was not raised in the trial court."
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With respect to actions to "quiet !title", Professor
Moore states that "all persons interested in title who will
be directly affected by the Decree are indispensable parties" (Page 2312, 2314).
Certainly, under the uncontroverted facts in this record, the State of Utah has an interest in the title to the
water and water rights involved and would be directly
affected by a decree quieting title to the same in Appellant.
Therefore, in any event, the relief sought through this Appeal cannot be awarded to Appellant because of the absence
of an indispensable party.
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit as follows :
Appellant's rig1h'ts in this proceeding, if any, run
against Orem City or Metropolitan Water District of Orem,
not against Alta Ditch & Canal Company. Appellant's only
right as against A lta is as the owner of 'two shares of capital stock. Appellant has been afforded all rights and privileges to which he is entitled as a shareholder of A1lta.
1.

1

2. Appellant consented to and ratified the water '1ease
and exchange agreements involved and is bound by the
provisions thereof.
3. Pretermitting Appellant's consent and ratification,
Alta had the leg1al power tD enter into such agreements
without the consent of the Appellant and Appellant is
bound by the terms thereby.
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4. Alta has neither interfered with nor threatened
to interfere with the use of water or water conveyance
facilities by AppeUant and certain'ly no esfuppel arises
against Alta on the record in th'is case.
5. The relief sought through this action and appeal
cannot be granted because of Appellant's failure to join an
indispensable party.
6. Appellant has waived his right on this appeal to
raise any factual insufficiency to support the Findings of
Faot by the Trial Judge.
7. The Findings of Faot duly entered by the court
below are supported by oompetent, relevant and sufficient
evidence and the conclusions of law and judgment entered
thereon are in all respects appropriate and proper.
8.

The judgment appealed from must be affirmed.

Dated this 27th day of February, 1969.
GEORGE W. LATIMER and
KEITH E. TAYLOR
of and for
PARSONS, BERLE, EV ANS
& LATIMER
520 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent,
Alta Ditch & Canal Company

APPENDIX I.
In ,the handling of Civil No. 15,460, the Trial Court
determined thaJt primarily legial questions were involved,
as contrasted with factual disputes, and consequently it
entered 'its "Memorandum Decision" prior Ito the trial on
September 10, 1949. The following rulings contained in
that Memorandum Decision are pertinent here: (See Ex.
3, Vol. I, Memorandum Decision.)
1) At page 3, the Court enunciated the position of
olJ Alta Ditch & Canal Company and its shareholders as
follows:
"The defendants oontend that there was no
need to liquidaJte the old corporation or wind up its
affairs, because upon the legal d~ath of the old corporation, the legal title automatically went to the
holders of srtock and ·Since .that time all debits have
been fully paid without winding up."
2) In disagreeing with the ~egal conclusions of the
defendants, the Court stateJ at pages 6 and 7 :
"Thus while it appears that the exact quesition
here presented has never been before our Supreme
Court, this court is convinced that the effect of the
statute is to prolong the iife of the corporation with
all of its ownerships, duties and obligations, limited
only by the duty of its officers and directors to
'wind it up' and the powers incident thereto. Certainly such a conclusion presents a clear cut picture
of rights rand duties without fiction or hypothesis.
Under it, the corporation cannot engage in corporate business beyond that essential to wind up the
affairs. It has aJt hand the same title to all real and
personal property that irt had at its expiration in
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order 1Jo expedite its winding up. It has the power
after payment of a'l'l of its ju.sit obligaJtions and husbanding of a:ll of its assets to dispose of such assets
by sale, if that is for the best inrtereslt of the stockholders, and distribrution of the net proceeds, of under the authority of the 'otherwise' provision of the
statute, it may distribute the ,asselts in kind. The
duty to wind up is clear in ithe statute. The remedy
of creditors is provided in suit agaln:st the corporation. Remedy to stockholders is by mandamus to
compel the Board of Directors to per/ orm its legal
duty. (104-68-2 U. C. A. 1943) ." (Emphasis
added).
The Court then conltinued at page 7 :
"The court concludes and holds ·that there was
a legal duty upon the old corporiaJtion :to wind up
and that thaJt dutty still exists, and that so long as
1Jhat duty has not been discharged, the old corporation is still the legal owner of all of the assets held
by it ait the date of the expira-tion of its charter except those which have been employed in liquidaJting
its obligations or oitherwise used reasonably in the
course of winding up, or which have been lost by
virtue of ·some proviisfons of law. It follows that the
individual water users are not the real parties in
interest because title to the property in question
still rests in the old corporation subject Ito winding
up its affairs which winding up includes conveyance
by it of its remaining assets after payment of a:H
Gbligatbions." (EmphaJsis added).
1

Hence, the Court specificamy heid that the legal tivle
to the water, waiter rigihts and water system 'invoilved was
in the old corporiation, and ndt in its shareho~ders. Furthermore, lits shareholders, tthe individual water users, were not
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the real parties in interest and were not neces:sary parties
tJo the action. As stated by :the Court, tthe "remedy to stockholders is by mandamus to compel the Board of Directors
to perform its legal duty."
The Court itfuen oonJtinued at pages 7 and 8 as follows:
"So concluding, it must follow thaJt contained
within the duty of the (Yid corporattion to wind up
its affairs, and for such purpose to hold, control and
preserve the asselts is its power and authority for
disitribu!tJion and regulation of the water rights during such period of windi:ng up. Such power and
authority, foe Court holds, are l()nly incidental and
necessary to the winding up and come within the
express provisions of rtlhe s:tatute (18-1-2, supra) in
tJhese terms :
" 'And exercise a li other incidenJta:l and necessary powers.'
1

"It follows thus that administration of the
water by the new corporiation has been without authority of l'aw, bu!t not void, because it has been
acceded to by all of the equitable owners of the title
and there 'is no one to comp~ain. * * *
"The foregoing reasoning and holding effectively answers issue of law #9 inasmuch as the
conclusion necessarily excludes any theory of the
existence of a tenancy in common as to the property
of the corporation. Title being still in the old corporation for purposes of liquidation, there is no tenancy in common." (Emphasis added).
It is, therefore, dear thait the argument of Appellant
thaJt he is entitled to righrbs in A'11t;a Ditch waiter as a tenant
in common as a stoclclro1der of the o:ld corporattion flies into
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the face of the express ruling of the Trial Court fo the contrary. As will be demonstr:atbed below, Appellant was a
party Ito that proceeding and he did nat perfect an appea1
therefrom. Furthermore, the action of the new Alta Ditch
& Canal Company was not void beciause acquiesced in by
al'l p1arties.
3) At page 50, the Court found and concluded as
follows:

"Because of the finding and holding that the
new company has acquired no property in the Alta
Ditch, its course, its diversions or its water, the
Court holds thait the new corporation has no interest whatsoever to distribute or regulaJted such waters beyond that which may be accorded to it by
common consent of persons interested. This is not
an enforceable right as against any pe1~son who declines to accept it for the reason that al'l title and
right to conduct the property for purposes of liquidation remains with the old corporation unrtil it is
liquidated according to the provisions of the law."
The Court continued at Page 55:
"It is further ordered that the individual defendants proceed forthwith to liquidate ,the affairs
of the old Alta Ditch & Canal Company and to convey to the present equitable owners thereof or to
their heirs, executors, adminrstmJtors or assigns as
their interesits may appear their propo:ritionate undivided interests in all of the property, assets, rights
iand privileges now owned and possessed by the said
corporation after payment of all just debts, claims
and liabilities."
Hence, even prior to the ,trial of Civil No. 15,460, the
Court had ordered that the Trustees of the old corporati()n
1

1
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forthwith proceed to liquidate the affairs of the old company and fo convey fo the "equitable owners" thereof or
their successors in 'interest all of the property, assets, rights
and privileges owned by the old corporation.
In its Findings of Fact following the trial, the Court
in Civil acition No. 15,460 found that James Ferguson was
the equi.rtable owner of a small continuous flow of water for
culinary purposes, that Orem City was the equitable owner
of approximately a 100/288th interest and that the equitable title of the balance of the iruterest was in the new corporation. (See Ex. 3, Vol. II, Findings of Fact). In paragraph 3, the Court found that the legal title to the 188/2'88th
interest was conveyed to the old corporation in exchange
for corporate stock. In paragraphs 14 and 46, the Court
found that all remaining interests of the incorporators
were conveyed to the new Alta Ditch & Canal Company in
in 1946.
Paragraph 14 reads:

"* * * all of the individual users having or
claiming any stock in s aid old corporation or any
rights in the Alta Di1tch or Springs, except plaintiff
(Orem City), at the time of s~gning said new Articles of Incorporation, conveyed and transferred to
said new oorporation their right, tirtle and interest
in and to said A'lta water, springs and otller property here involved." (Emphasis added).
1

Paragraph 46 reads:
"That prior to the institution of rthis action, all
of the owners of stock in the defunct Alta Ditch &
Canal Company, except Plaiintiff (Orem City), and
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all of the individual users of water from Alta Diitch
assigned, and transferred, to the Alta Ditch and
Canal Company (new) aU their right, title and interest in, and to, said waters, together wi1th all property of the old corporation."
Under date of March 27, 1950, the Court entered its
Judgment and Decree in Civil No. 15,460. In the Judgment
and Decree, the Court found in pertinent part: (See Ex.
3., Vol. II, Judgment).
"2. That on or about the 20th day of May,
1893, al'l of s aid owners of the right to use Alta
waters, dams, diverting works, ditches and other
works connected therewith, became the original incorporafors of, and duly conveyed and transferred
all of their and each of their rights to said water
and property to, the said Alta Ditch & Canal Company (old), which received and became legal owner
of said rights and property and that said company
was the legal owner thereof, together with all of
their improvements and additions at the time of
the expiration of its chariter as in the F:indings set
out in more detail.
1

"3. That on May 20, 1943, at the time of the
expiration of the charter and franchise of the Alta
Ditch & Cana:l Company, iit became, was, and now
is, the duty of said corporation, through its Director-Trustees, the individual defendants herein, and
ithe Court hereby orders them, to wind up its affiairs; to pay its ,debts and obligiations, if any, and
to promptly transfer the title to all of its remaining
property and rights to the parties entitled thereto,
including plaintiff, which is entitled to 1001;2 288ths
of such property and rights. (Emphasis added).

"*

*

*
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"8. That the new Alta Ditch & Canal Company !has acquired no title in, or rto, the said Alta
D:iitch or water and has no right to control or liquidate said property or rights beyond thalt which may
be accorded to it by common coil!Sent of the persons
interested, the right to regui ate and 1administer the
property for ithe purpose of liquidation remaining
with tlle old corporation until its winding up in
acc·ordance with the provisions of this Decree."
1

1

Following entry of Judgment, the Defendants filed a
motion for new trial whfoh prompted the parties, by way
of settlement, and to avoid further litigation, to enter into
a Stipulation to Amend lthe Judgment and Decree on January 19, 19'51. Appellant here 'himself was a party to this
Stipulation. He admitted at the trial that the original &tipulation bears his signature (Tr. 1'17-8). The Stipulation
provides in part, amending Paragraph 55 of the original
Findings of Faeit: (See Ex. 3, Vol. II, Stipulation, pages
5-6).
"55. It is understood that the Alta Ditch &
Canal Company, and its stockholders, and Orem
City as a tenant in common, sha!ll have 'the right to
determine when iJt or they should have use for the
water. It is further understood and agreed that
when the water is kept in the Alta Ditch for the
sole use of Orem City and when Orem City uses
more of the water of Alta Ditch than its proportionate share of water 3:S hereinbefore specified,
Orem City shall pay the additional costs of maintaining the Alta Ditch in carrying the excess water
for Orem City and if the .A:lta Ditch shaH break
during freezing weather on account of conveying
water to Orem City when 'the Alita Ditch & Canal
Company and its stockholders have no use for or
1
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are not using water, any damages that may result
from such use of the canal 'by Orem City during
said time shall 'be paid for by Orem City." (Emphasis 'added).
1

Paragraph 9 of ithe Judgment and Decree was amended
in pertinent part to read : '(See Ex. 3, Vol. II, Stipulation,
pages 9-10) .
"That Orem City sha:ll pay for the diverting of
any excess water through the Alta Ditch & Canal
as provided in U. C. A. 1943, 100-1-9, and provided,
further, that if Orem City shal1 desire to use the
Alta Ditch or Canal during freezing weather or
such other time that the Alta Ditcih & Canal Company or its stockholders shaU not desire to use the
same, then and during such time, Orem City sha:ll
pay the cost of maintaining said canal and any damage that may result from using the same. It is understood that the Alta Ditch & Canal Company and
its stockholders shall have the right to determine
when they shall use the proportion of the water of
the Alta Ditch & Canal represented by their proportion thereof as heretofore specified in the Findings
of Fact herein." (Emphasis added).
1

Plaintiff signed the Stipulation: "(Individually and
as Director-Trustees of Alta Ditch & Canarl Company, a
defunct corporation.) Defendants." (See Ex. 3, Vol. II,
Stipulation, last page) .
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APPENDIX II.

Analysis Showing Inapplicability of Cases Cited
by Appellant
East River Bottom Water Co. vs. Boyce, et al., 102
Utah 149, 128 P. 2d 277.
1.

This case involved the validity of an inadvertent and
erroneous issue of seven shares of stock by the corporation.
The case turned upon a finding by the Trial Court that the
incorporators did not convey to the corporation their respective water rights. The water rights were never severed
from the land of the incorporators and remained appurtenant thereto. Since the corporation was not the owner of the
water rights, it obviously could not convey them.
The facts are exactly to the contrary in our case. The
District Court, both in Civi1 Action No. 15,460 and in the
case at bar, made findings, binding upon Appellant, thart
the rights of the water user incorporators had been effectively conveyed to the corporation, and thus severed from
the land. (See R. 87; Ex. 3, Vol. 2, Findings of Fact, Paragraphs 3, 14 and 46.) Hence, the holding of this case has
no bearing whatsoever upon the case at bar.

Continental Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City vs. Minersville Reservoir & Irrigation Co., 73 Utah 243, 273 P. 502.
2.

This case, like ithe East River Bottom Water Company
case supra involved an erroneous "over issue" of stock by
'
'
the corp'oration and a finding that the stockholders had
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not conveyed their water rights to the corporation. For 'the
reasons set out above, it is not here apropos.
3. Smithfield West Bench Irr. Co. vs. Union Central
Life Ins. Co., et al., (First Nat. Bank of Logan, et al., Interveners), 105 Utah 468, 142 P. 2d 866.

The long staitement quoted from this case at pages 15
and 16 of the Appellant's Brief relates to Logan Northern
Company, which wa:s not a party to that ,action and whose
Articles were not before the Court. Indeed, the record
there contained no evidence with respe0t to the intent of
the incorporators. The statement is mere dicta. In addition, it lacks substantial weight because of the absence of
either a finding by the Trial Cou~ or evidence with respect
to whether or not the underlying water rights had been
retained by the incorporators, as in the East River Bottom
Water Co. and Continental Nat. Bank of Salt Lake City
cases, supra, or whether the same had been conveyed to the
corporation, as in the c'ase at bar.
With respect to this dicta stated by Mr. Justice Larsen,
Chief Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion points up the
albsence of any findings or eV'idence relating to this matter
as follows:
"Mr. Justice Larsen conc1ludes ithat this is an
Irrigation Company 'in which the waters are held
as owners in common. I am unable to locate anything in the record Which reveals Whether the water
is held in common through the corporation or only
the canal facilities for transferring and applying it
are mutual or whether it is an ordinary stock company where the water is conveyed and stock issued
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for it. * * * The articles of Logan Northern
are not in the record. I do not think :that this court
can 1assume from the fact that the parties refer to
Logan Northern as a mutual water company, that
it is merely a Trusitee of the water, or that it is a
eorP'orate water master with no power to buy or
sell water, or that the stockholders of that company
are owners in common of the water."
It should be noted that, in addition to the findings
cited above under paragraph 1 of this Appendix to the
effect that the shareholders in the case at bar did in fact
convey their water rights to lthe corporation, the Court below in case No. 15,460 specifica1ly found that the water
users were not tenants in common of the water and water
rights involved. After having staJted in its Memorandum
Decision specifically that "it follows that the individua'l
water users are not the real parties in interest because title
to the property in question still rests in the old corporation

* * *"

the Trial Court in the prior case stated :

"The foregoing reasoning and holding effectively answers issue No. 9 inasmuch as the conc1u1sion necessarily excludes any theory of the existence
of a tenancy in common as to the property of the
corporation, tiitle being still in the old corporation.
For purposes of liquidation, there is no tenancy in
common." (See Ex. 3, Vol. 1, Memorandum Decision, Pages 7-8.)
It follows that Judge Larsen's diotum in the Smithfield West Bench Irrigation Co. case is wholly inapposite

here.
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However, it should be noted in passing that that dictum recognizes that the corporation can tranrsfer its water
with the "consent of the stockhdlders". As is argued in the
body of ithe Brief, Alta did obtain the consent of fue shareholders in conformance with the requirements of the applicable Non-Profit Corporation statute and, indeed, Appellant himself specifically consented thereto, benefited by
the transadtlion and raitified the same. Considered in that
posture, the case supports Respondent.
4.

Genola vs. Santaquin City, 96 Utah 88, 80 P. 2d

930.

In the Genola case, and by way of irrelevant comment,
the author Justice srtaJted a general rule that a stockholder
of a mutual water company has a ri.ght to demand his
aliquot share of water from the company according to the
method of distribution used by the company. We need not
quarrel with this d:idum as ilt ihas no bearing on the merits
of this case. Here, Appellant was 'afforded every right and
privilege due him on the same bas:i:s and at the same point
of diversion urtilized by other s:tockholders. Again we mention that the findings of lthe Trial Judge to this effect are
not challenged and the evidence is uncontroverted.
5. St. George City vs. Kirkland, et al., 17 Utah 2d
292, 409 P. 2d 970.
The only conceivable relevance of this case to the case
at bar is its ciitaltion of 'the Genola case, supra. The question of whether or not a mutual irrigation company has
the legal power to exchange water is not reached in either
St. George City or Genola.
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6. Salt Lake City vs. East Jordan Irrigation Co., 40
Utah 126, 121 P. 592 (1911).

We do not quarrel with the language from this case as
quoted at pages 17 and 18 of Appellant's Brief. However,
we challenge the suggestion there made th'at it has any
pevtinence or applicability to any issue in the case at bar.

Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. vs .Gunnison Irrigation Co., 448 P. 2d 707.
7.

We assume that this case must have been cirted by Appellant in support of his general contention that a mutual
irl'igation company has no power to exchange water. We
suggest, however, that irt holds to the contrary by making
crystal clear the applicability of the Non-Profit Corporation statutes which expressly authorize the same.
8.

In Re Johnson's Estate, 64 Utah 114, 228 Pac. 748.

S imilarly, this case dbes not tou0h the issue for which
cited by Appellant. In that case, the Court construed a
Will which bequeathed real estate but was silent with respect to ·W'ater represented by sitock in a mutual company
Which admittedly had never been severed from the land
and was still appurtenant thereto. Of significance, the
Court there quoted With approval from 2 Weil on Water
Rights (3rd Ed.) Sec. 12'69 as follows:
1

"* * * Whether the water is appurtenant
to the stockh older's land is a question of fact in each
case as is also whether on a sale of the land the
' righit passes as (an) appurtenance."
water
1

xiv
Interestingly, the Com~ there dis'tinguished George vs.
Robinson, 23 Utah 79, 63 Pac. 819 primarily upon the
ground th'at in the George case the waiter rights involved
were "owned by a third person" and rthalt the "'water rights"
had been transferred "away from the land conveyed". We
submit that the same facts appear in the case at bar and
that in Re Johnson's Estate must be distinguished from ithe
in&tant case upon the same ground.
Contrary to Appellant's contention, this case holds that
questions of appurrtenance, severance and alienability of
water rights turn upon the "facts", not upon arbirtrary and
fixed rules of law. Such "facts" in the case at bar were
found against Appellant by the Trial Judge.

Arnold vs. Huntington C. & R. Association, 64
Utah 534, 231 P. 622.
9.

Again, this case does not hold that a water company
has no power to exchange water or water rights. There,
one shareholder requested permissiron from the corporation
to take his share of water through an alternate ditch. Permission was granted by the corporaJtion. Following such
permission, the plaintiffs abandoned the old ditch and
spent $'2500.00 in preparing the new ditcih for use. This
change did not inconvenience any sharehoMer or the corporation. The corporation, after it "sitood by and permitted
the plaintiffs to expend large sums of money", threatened
to force plaintiffs 'to revert to the old, abandoned ditch. On
these facits, both the Trial Coum and the Supreme Court
afforded rellief to plaintiffs by enjoining the execution of
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such threat by the corporation. However, in so doing, the
Supreme Court ,intimates thart it would have no power or
jurisdiction to interfere with the internal affairs of the
corporation under circumstances such as those involved in
the case at bar. The Court stated:
"At first blush the writer was under the impression thalt this was a case where the court was
asked to interfere with the internal affairs of the
corporation. Upon only slight reflection, however,
he became convinced thart such is not the case, and
that the Di~ricit Court has kept well within its
powers and jurisdiction in granting the relief
prayed for by the plaintiffs."
In the case at bar, neither the elements of estoppel
established by the fa0ts in tthe Arnold case nor the discrimination against the plaJintiffs and in favor of other stockholders is present. The Trial Court specifically held to the
contrary and those findings are sustained by the evidence.
Those circumstances alone differentiate the two cases.
10. Baird vs. Upper Canal & Irr. Co., et al., 70 Utah
57, 257 P. 1060.

Similarly, this case is not apposite to any issue now
before this court. There, plaintiff was a minority stockholder and desired to utilize her share of the available
water on properly beyond the area norma1ly served by the
irrigation company. The company arbitrarily denied the
pla:intiff the right to divert the water at her expense for
use 1Jo such extended area. 'I'he court ruled that plaintiff
was entitled to her share of available waiter and that she
cou'ld utilize the same beyond the territorial area customar-
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ily served by the irrigation company at her own expense so

long as she did not interfere with the rights of any other
shareholder.
Again, the court did not reach the question as to the
legal power of an irrigation company to exchange water or
water rights. However, :the court there did recognize by
way of dictum that such a company may make other arrangements as to the distribu1:Jion of water. lit said:
1

"In the absence of any arrangement to the contrary, water in a mutual corporation must be delivered in proportion to the stock owned. The Board
of Directors, as a maJtter of law, owes the duty to
distribute to each stockholder his proportion of the
water available for distribution among the s:bockholders."
In the case at bar, the Trial Court did find that Appellant had been tendered his proportion of the water available for distribution among the shareholders and :that finding is not attacked by Appellant and is suppor,ted by the
evidence. However, the corporation in the instant case,
made other arrangements pursuant Ibo ltlhe power vested in
it by its Articles and the statutes of the State of Utah, as
recogn:ized and stated in the Beggs case, supra, for a lease
and exchange of waters which increased the amount of
water "avail·able for distribution among the stockholders".
Interestingly, both in the Genola case, supra, and in the
Baird case, the water actually in issue for distribution was
"exchange" water wh'ich had been made available for distribution through the type of "exchange agreements" which
Appellant here attacks.
1

